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This paper discusses counterfactual conditionals like ( l a-b) in which the time 
indicated by the tense morpheme(s) and the time denoted by the co-occurring 
temporal adverb do not match. 
( 1 )  a.  If  John had given flowers to Mary TOMORROWF, she would have been 
pleased. 
b .  If we had gone out for a walk TOMORROWF, we would have had a good 
time. 
Suppose that Mary ' s  birthday is tomorrow, but her boyfriend John thought it was 
yesterday and gave flowers to her yesterday. Mary was so disappointed that John 
was mistaken about her birthday and she was not even pleased with the flowers she 
received. ( la) says therefore that if we assume counterfactually that the "same 
thing" happens tomorrow instead of yesterday, then Mary is pleased then (Le. ,  
tomorrow). Note here that since Mary is already disappointed, it  is too late for John 
to do the "same thing" (Le., giving flowers to Mary) again tomorrow and please 
Mary. Put another way, two times are competing for the time of John ' s  giving 
flowers to Mary, and the time at which this actually took place must be located in 
the past (lb) makes the same point Suppose that we were able to go out for a walk 
only once (within a contextually determined set of alternative dates) because of 
scheduling constraints and that today and tomorrow were the only two alternative 
possibilities. We decided to go out today, did so, and got rained on. Now the 
weather forecast says that tomorrow is guaranteed to be a sunny day. In this 
situation, ( l b) seems to be true. In both ( la) and ( l b) ,  the temporal adverb 
tomorrow is said to be "focused" in that it has intonational prominence. This is 
indicated by a subscripted F in (1). This type of example is not discussed explicitly 
in previous proposals such as Stalnaker ( 1968), Lewis ( l973) and Kratzer ( 1 98 1 ,  
1989). Rooth ( 1985) discusses some examples of counterfactuals with a focused 
constituent in the antecedent and proposes an account on the basis of Kratzer' s  
( 1981)  proposal, but his examples do not involve focused temporal adverbs. This 
paper presents a proposal that modifies the Kratzer-Rooth account to accommodate 
data such as ( la-b). 
The basic intuition about counterfactual conditionals is relatively 
straightforward. The antecedent of a counterfactual conditional normally posits a 
contrary-to-fact situation and draws some conclusion from this supposition. ! When 
we go through this reasoning, we make minimal adjustments to the actual world 
necessary to make the proposition given by the antecedent true, and then assert that 
the consequent is true in this hypothetical situation. Kratzer ( 1 98 1 )  expresses her 
intuitions as in (2) . 
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(2) 
Toshiyuki Ogihara 
The truth of counterfactuals depends on everything which is the case in the 
world under consideration: in assessing them, we have to consider all the 
possibilities of adding as many facts to the antecedent as consistency 
permits. If the consequent follows from every such possibility, then (and 
only then), the whole counterfactual is true. 
English conditionals of the form (3a) normally introduce counterfactual situations 
located in the past as in (3b) and are referred to as past counterfactuals. I say 
"normally" because ( l a-b) do not conform to this generalization in that they 
introduce counterfactual situations in the future. 
(3) a. If . . .  had p.p . . . .  , . . .  would have p.p . . . .  
(where p.p. indicates the past participial form of  a verb) 
b .  If John had been rich, he would have been happy. 
A question naturally arises as to why the past perfect rather than the simple past is 
used to indicate a counterfactual situation in (3b).  In this connection, we should 
also examine present counterfactuals which are schematized in (4a) and are 
exemplified by (4b). 
(4) a. If . . .  V-ed . . . .  , . . .  would V . . . .  
(where V-ed indicates the past tense form of  a (stative) verb, and V 
indicates the infInitival form of a (stative) verb) 
b .  If John were rich, he would be happy. 
We clearly find a pattern in (3) and (4) . The antecedent of (4b) posits a 
counterfactual situation at the utterance time but is in the simple past tense, whereas 
the antecedent of (3b) establishes a counterfactual situation at some (contextually 
salient) past time but is in the past perfect.2 latridou (2000) claims that the past 
tense as used in (3b) and (4b) is "fake" in that it does not convey the meaning of 
anteriority. Instead, it has the meaning of being evaluated at a world different from 
the actual world. This can be taken to mean roughly that the past is responsible for 
conveying a counterfactual implicature. This in turn means that the perfect is used in 
past counterfactuals to indicate anteriority. 
latridou's  account of tense morphemes in counterfactuals is consistent with 
what is implicitly assumed in the previous proposals about counterfactuals. For 
example, Lewis ( 1973) posits the counterfactual conditional connective 0--+, which 
produces formulas such as (5a). This translates the English counterfactual (5b) and 
reads offIcially as 'If it were the case that John is rich, then it would the case that he 
is happy. '3 
(5) a .  John is  rich 0--+ John is  happy 
b .  If John were rich, he would be happy. 
This analysis indicates that the past tense in the antecedent and the auxiliary would 
in the consequent are used for indicating counterfactuality and not anteriority. The 
present tense in (5a) or its paraphrase indicates that the temporal location of 
whatever the antecedent describes is the utterance time. By extending this general 
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idea, Lewis informally presents the case of past counterfactuals in the following 
way .  
(6) a. John was rich 0-+ John was happy 
b .  If John had been rich, he would have been happy. 
Lewis' s  "official English reading" of (6a) is 'If it were the case that John were rich, 
it would be the case that John was happy' .  Lewis is of course aware that this is a 
sentence "obscure in meaning and of doubtful grammaticality" if it is understood to 
be a colloquial English sentence. (6a) corresponds to the colloquial English 
conditional (6b), which is derived in the following way according to Lewis: "the 
subjunctive 'were' of the counterfactual construction and the ' were ' of the 
antecedent are transformationally combined into a past subjunctive." Thus, Lewis' s  
idea about the semantic contribution of tense morphemes in counterfactual 
conditionals is very close to latridou' s. 
Given the above informal discussion, it seems reasonable to posit the truth 
conditions (7) for (3a) combining the ideas of Lewis ( 1973) and latridou (2000). 
(7) A conditional of the form "If A had VLed, B would have V2-ed" is true in 
We at te iff at some contextually salient time t earlier than te in We, all worlds 
W closest to the actual world We in terms of a similarity hierarchy among 
those in which "A VI " (tenseless) is true at t, it follows that "B V2" 
(tenseless) is true at t in w. 
Note : te and W e indicate the utterance time and the actual world, 
respectively. 
(7) accounts for (3b). However, (7) has problems with (la-b). 
The flrst problem with (7) is its requirement that the counterfactual situation 
be located in the past. ( la-b) violate this requirement because the adverb tomorrow 
clearly denotes a future time.4 It is not that the proposal given in (7) is completely 
off the mark, however. Intuitively, ( l a-b) are analogous to other past 
counterfactuals such as (8), in which a name is focused, in that they make reference 
to some relevant past situations. 
(8) If BILLp had given flowers to Mary, she would have been pleased. 
A counterfactual such as (8) in which a non-temporal expression is focused leads us 
to believe that what is located in the past is what the antecedent describes (i.e., an 
event of Bill ' s  giving flowers to Mary). However, this hypothesis does not cover 
all examples of counterfactuals that conform to the schema in (3a); we have already 
seen that in ( la-b), what is described by the antecedent is located in the future. I 
hypothesize that the perfect does not indicate the time of the hypothetical eventuality 
described by the antecedent.5 Rather, it indicates the time of an eventuality that 
obtains in the actual world and is contrasted with the antecedent eventuality. 6 For 
example, the contextually salient past time for (8) is understood to be the time at 
which someone other than Bill gave flowers to Mary. Although the time of Bill ' s  
giving flowers to Mary is interpreted to be simultaneous with this time, I argue that 
this result is obtained indirectly through the use of a covert adverb then .  This 
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analysis is motivated by examples like ( la-b) but can also be used for examples like 
(8). We will formalize this idea below. 
Another possible problem with (7) is that it might not make the right 
predictions as to which worlds are closest to the actual one in terms of a relevant 
similarity hierarchy. For example, it is arguable that in ( la) the worlds in which 
John gave flowers to Mary yesterday and will give some more tomorrow are more 
similar to the actual one than those in which John did not give any flowers to her 
yesterday and will give some tomorrow. However, the empirical data tell us 
otherwise. The consequent must be evaluated in worlds where John gives flowers 
to Mary tomorrow and not yesterday. This is puzzling because it is certainly not 
impossible for John to give flowers to Mary at these two relevant times. As 
mentioned earlier, It i s  reasonable to conclude that John 's  giving flowers to  Mary 
yesterday and tomorrow does not make Mary happy since the fact remains that 
John was wrong about Mary 's birthday. Even if Mary gets happier by receiving 
more flowers tomorrow, this does not seem to be the point of the counterfactual in 
question. Intuitively, what we need to do with regard to ( la) is to imagine a world 
in which John gives flowers to Mary tomorrow instead of yesterday. The same 
point can be made with ( lb), going out for a walk today and tomorrow does not 
allow us to have a good time overall. This must receive some explanation. 
Another fact worth noting here is that the type of interpretation that ( la-b) 
receive is truly counterfactual in that (9a-b) would not be appropriate in the contexts 
in question. 
(9) a. If John gave flowers to Mary TOMORROWF, she would be pleased. 
b .  If we went out for a walk TOMORROWF, we would have a good time. 
(9a-b) exemplify what Iatridou (2000) refers to as future less vivid conditionals. 
They would be appropriate in circumstances where John's  giving flowers to Mary 
tomorrow (or our going out for a walk tomorrow) is unlikely but is not completely 
ruled out. This type of supposition is very different from what you find in 
counterfactual conditionals. More importantly, the proposition described by the 
antecedent is not contrasted with any proposition that was true in the actual world. 
Thus, (9a-b) and ( l a-b) cannot be used interchangeably. The presence of an 
(actual) eventuality that is contrasted with the hypothetical eventuality is probably 
not a necessary condition for a felicitous use of a counterfactual conditional even 
when it contains a focused constituent. However, it is arguably a sufficient 
condition for a felicitous use of a counterfactual conditional. For example, ( la-b) 
are clearly counterfactual in that the speaker posits a contrary-to-fact situation and 
attempts to draw a conclusion from it. For example, ( la) can be used when John 
actually gave flowers to Mary yesterday. The counterfactual situation being 
entertained is one in which John gives flowers to Mary tomorrow instead of 
yesterday. The idea is that these two situations (one real and one hypothetical) are 
identical in all relevant respects except that they take place at different times. They 
are identical in that John is giving flowers to Mary intending to celebrate her 
birthday. 
When the antecedent of a counterfactual contains a non-temporal focused 
constituent, two situations being compared often involve the same individua1(s) and 
have the same temporal extension. Therefore, they are assumed to be mutually 
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exclusive for pragmatic reasons. For example, assume that in ( 10) John actually 
went to Tavern A. 
(10) If John had gone to [TAVERN B]p, he would have had a good time. 
The default assumption here is that John chooses one tavern among some 
alternatives and goes there. In this case, by assuming counterfactually that he went 
to Tavern B, one automatically excludes the possibility that he went to Tavern A. 
However, if we complicate the scenario slightly, we can easily imagine a situation 
in which John goes to both Tavern A and Tavern B. For example, we could assume 
that John was taking part in a pub crawl in which he and his friends visits many 
taverns in a single evening. In this case, John can go to Tavern B in addition to 
others. Thus, it is doubtful that pragmatics alone can account for the strongly 
preferred reading of ( 10) :  If John had gone to Tavern B instead of some other 
place(s) , he would have had a good time. 
It is true that the above examples of counterfactuals require that they be used 
in a context in which two or more alternative possibilities are compared. However, 
this seems to stem from the nature of the focus structure of the conditional in 
question rather than from purely pragmatic factors. In the rest of the paper, I will 
show how the focus-related information in counterfactuals is exploited to account 
for their overall interpretation. 
2. Kratzer's  Theory of Counterfactual Conditionals and Root h ' s  
Theory o f  Focus 
This section fIrst discusses Kratzer' s  ( 198 1) theory of counterfactuals. Then we 
will see how Rooth ( 1985) combines his theory of focus with Kratzer' s theory of 
counterfactuals to account for the semantic effects of focus in counterfactuals. 
In formalizing her theory, Kratzer ( 198 1) posits a functionf that selects for 
any world w the set of all propositions that are "the case" in w.7 Given this function 
f, Aw(P) for any proposition p and world w is defIned as the set of all consistent 
subsets of f(w) u {p } which contain p .  We can then say that a counterfactual 
conditional of the form "if p, q" is true in w iff the truth of q follows from every 
maximal set in Aw (P) (assuming that maximal sets of propositions exist in Aw 
(P» .8 Kratzer says that f must be a partition function such that for any world w, 
nj(w) = { w } .  That is, j(w) must be a set of propositions that characterize the world 
w uniquely. If we adopt this idea, a question arises as to how we determine what 
propositions to keep and what propositions to get rid of. Kratzer attempts to "kick 
out" some propositions by adopting the idea that some propositions lump together. 
For example, assume that Hans and Babette spent the evening together by going to 
a restaurant called "Dutchman's  Delight." Given this fact, suppose counterfactually 
that Babette had gone to a bistro called "Frenchman' s  Horror" instead. We seem to 
be justifIed in concluding from this supposition that Hans would have gone there, 
too. This follows from Kratzer' s  proposal if we assume that f(we) (where We 
indicates the actual world) includes the proposition "Babette and Hans spent the 
evening together." If this proposition is an element off(wc), then this amounts to 
lumping together the propositions "Hans went to Dutchman' s  Delight" and "Babette 
went to Dutchman's  Delight." That is, if one of these propositions was false, then 
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the other would have to be false as well. Given this supposition, we can conclude 
that (1 1) is true in the situation under consideration as desired. 
( 1 1)  If  Babette had gone to Frenchman' s  Horror, Hans would have gone there, 
too.  
Note that ( 1 1)  contains a focused constituent, namely Frenchman's  Horror. The 
fact that this constituent is focused is clearly related to the fact that Frenchman' s  
Horror i s  contrasted with Dutchman's  Delight. In general, when a counterfactual 
conditional contains a focused constituent in its antecedent, we can predict which 
proposition should be gotten rid of by paying attention to the focus-related 
information available in the conditional. Let us consider ( 12a-b), which differ from 
each other only with respect to focused constituents. 
( 12) a .  If John had married SUSANp, he would have been happy. 
b. If John had MARRIEDp Susan, he would have been happy. 
(12a) strongly implicates that John actually married someone other than Susan. We 
then go through the following reasoning: Suppose counterfactually that John had 
married Susan. Then can we conclude from this assumption that he would have 
been happy? On the other hand, (12b) is felicitous only if John actually had some 
non-matrimonial personal relationship with Susan. (His having married to someone 
other than Susan is not required.) We then reason as follows :  S uppose 
counterfactually that John had married Susan. Can we conclude that he would have 
been happy then? In this way, the semantic difference between ( 12a) and ( 1 2b) 
clearly stems from the intonational difference between them. The generalization that 
emerges from an examination of such examples is that the proposition that is  
"kicked out" from the set of propositions against which the consequent is examined 
is obtained by replacing the focused expression in the antecedent with an expression 
of the same semantic type. 
We should now discuss how to account for focus-related facts in 
counterfactuals within a Kratzer-type proposal. As mentioned earlier, the fact that a 
proposition contrasted with the one given by the antecedent is kicked out cannot be 
explained in terms of pragmatics alone. There are many instances in which the 
proposition described in the antecedent of a conditional is consistent with the 
proposition that is contrasted with what the antecedent conveys and is true in the 
actual world. In other words, we could entertain the possibility that two competing 
propositions are both true. Consider examples like those in ( 1 3). 
( 1 3) a .  If John had drank SOFf DRINKp at the party, he  would not have had a 
hangover. 
b .  If I had asked MARYp for help, I would have fmished the book in time. 
The intended interpretation of (1 3a) is clear. However, assuming that John actually 
drank wine at the party, it is not clear why the counterfactual assumption that he 
drank soft drink precludes his drinking wine as well. One can certainly drink soft 
drink as well as wine at the same party. This in tum means that it is not obvious 
how the proposition "John drank wine" is kicked out from all maximal sets in 
A Wc("John drank soft drink at the party") . In ( 1 3b), assume that the speaker 
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actually asked Sue for help. Intuitively, the consequent must be evaluated in worlds 
in which the speaker asked Mary for help and not others. It is clear, however, that 
the speaker could have asked two people simultaneously for help. Kratzer' s  
proposal appeals to the lumping of two relevant propositions in each case to account 
for its interpretation. In ( 1 3a) we would probably need to say that the proposition 
"John drank only one type of drink at the party" is an element ofj{we). This has the 
effect of lumping together "John drank soft drink" and "John did not drink wine," 
for example. In (1 3b),  "I asked only one person for help" would be infiwe), which 
has the effect of lumping together "I asked Mary for help" and "I did not ask Sue 
for help," for example. 
The temporal examples in (la-b) (repeated here as (14a-b)) have exactly the 
same characteristic as non-temporal examples except that the mutually exclusive 
nature of the two propositions in temporal examples is more surprising than non­
temporal ones. 
( 14) a .  If John had given flowers to Mary TOMORROWp, she would have been 
pleased. 
b .  If we had gone out for a walk TOMORROWp, we would have had a good 
time. 
Since John' s  giving flowers can take place both yesterday and tomorrow, it is not 
obvious that John's  giving flowers to Mary yesterday and his giving flowers to 
Mary tomorrow are mutually exclusive. In Kratzer' s  proposal, we would need to 
posit a more general fact and let it be an element ofJtwe). For instance, in ( 14a) ,  it 
might be "John can give flowers to Mary only once a year to celebrate her 
birthday."  This would make John's  giving flowers to Mary yesterday and John 's  
giving flowers to Mary tomorrow mutually exclusive. Kratzer' s  account succeeds 
in accounting for why some propositions must be kicked out. However, assuming 
that we adopt Kratzer' s  proposal, we want to explain how focus facts are related to 
the selection of the function / since the examples discussed in the paper are all 
focus-sensitive. 
Rooth ( 1 985) provides an account of focus effects in counterfactual 
conditionals on the basis of Kratzer's  proposal. He examines Dretske ' s  ( 1 972) 
examples in ( 1 5) and concludes that the p-set (i .e. , the set of alternative 
propositions) is used in each case to produce an existentially quantified proposition 
that is chosen by the partition function/for the actual world We. The situation being 
entertained is one in which Clyde marries Bertha because being married at the age 
of thirty is the condition for being eligible for an inheritance. 
( 15) a .  If Clyde hadn't MARRIEDp Bertha, he  would not have been eligible for 
the inheritance. 
b .  If Clyde hadn't married BERTHAp, he would not have been eligible for 
the inheritance. 
For each example, we can obtain an existentially quantified proposition with a 
variable in the position of the focused expression after removing negation: ( l 6a) for 
( 15a),  and ( 16b) for ( 15b). 
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( 16) a .  There is a relation R such that <Clyde, Bertha>E R,  where R is one of 
the contextually salient relations. 
b .  There is an individual x such that Clyde married x, where x is one of the 
contextually salient individuals. 
Rooth claims that each proposition thus obtained is an element of f( we) for the 
relevant example. This means that the consequent of ( 15a) is evaluated with respect 
to a set of worlds in which Clyde dates but is not married to Bertha (for example). 
In this situation, it is correct to conclude that the counterfactual conditional is true. 
By contrast, ( 15b) is intuitively false becausej(we) contains the proposition ( 1 6b). 
This means that the consequent in ( 1 5b) follows from the assumption that Clyde 
married someone other than Bertha. We can conclude that the counterfactual is false 
since as long as Clyde is married, he should be eligible for the inheritance 
regardless of who his spouse is. Although it seems artificial to remove negation 
before calculating the relevant p-set, this proposal makes the right predictions for 
the examples ( 1 6a-b). 
Let us now discuss the crucial examples ( 14a-b) in light of the Kratzer­
Rooth proposal. In order to do so, we must determine at least tentatively the 
semantic contribution of tense morphemes (in particular, that of the perfect) . First, 
as far as the proposition conveyed by the antecedent is concerned, our intuition 
favors the idea of ignoring tense. Thus, we assume that the proposition conveyed 
by the antecedent in ( 14a) is that associated with "John gives flowers to Mary 
tomorrow." Second, Rooth ' s  proposal dictates that an existentially quantified 
proposition obtained with a bound variable in the position of the focused expression 
be an element off(wc). In (14a), the focused expression is the adverb tomorrow. 
As for the semantic contribution of the tense morphemes, let us leave open the 
possibilities and try out two options here . One possibility is to obtain an 
existentially quantified proposition as in ( 17a) and let it be an element off(wc) .  
Alternatively, we ignore tense morphemes and let ( 1 7b) be the existentially 
quantified proposition in question. 
( 17) a .  There is an interval t such that John gives flowers to Mary at t and t is a 
contextually salient past interval. 
b .  There is an interval t such that John gives flowers to Mary at t. 
Let us examine these two possibilities one by one. If we adopt the option ( 17a), we 
are led to an undesirable result because we must evaluate the consequent of ( 14a) in 
worlds in which John gives flowers to Mary at a past time (yesterday in our 
scenario) as well as tomorrow. On the other hand, if we adopt ( 17b) ,  then no new 
information is added since it is entailed by the proposition conveyed by the 
antecedent, i.e. , John gives flowers to Mary tomorrow. This also makes the wrong 
prediction. We would need to evaluate the consequent in worlds in which John 
gives flowers to Mary tomorrow. Unfortunately, this set of worlds includes tho se 
in which John gives flowers to Mary yesterday as well. According to our intuitions, 
Mary is not pleased (tomorrow) in such a world. However, the proposal predicts 
otherwise. This is an undesirable result. 
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3. Proposal 
In this section, I shall present a proposal to account for the above data. First, let us 
discuss the problem of a mismatch between the assumed semantic contribution of 
the tense form and that of the temporal adverb in (14a-b): the perfect is understood 
to indicate anteriority, but the adverb tomorrow clearly denotes a future time. I 
believe that a solution to this problem is suggested by the oft voiced but rarely 
formalized claim that the contribution of past tense (in normal declarative sentences) 
is presuppositional in that it indicates a contextually specified past time interval that 
has already been introduced by the time the sentence is uttered. In a simple 
declarative sentence, the proposition it describes (i.e. , the sentence less the tense 
morpheme) is asserted to obtain at this interval.9 I contend that the same is true of 
conditionals, except that the past interval indicated by the perfect (which we could 
assume has the role of a past tense morpheme) is not the time at which the 
proposition described by the antecedent of the conditional is true. Rather it is the 
time at which some proposition contrasted with the one specified by the antecedent 
is true (at least when some constituent in the antecedent is focused). This is the right 
generalization about the examples discussed so far. to The truth conditions of past 
countetfactuals with a focused constituent in the antecedent can be given as in ( 1 8) 
in a preliminary fashion. 
( 1 8) The truth conditions for a sentence of the form "If DPI PAST PERF3 VPl ,  
DP2  would PERF3 VP2" are given in the following way. Let q be the 
denotation of "DPI VPl" (tenseless), and r the denotation of "DP2 VP2" 
(tenseless) , where q and r are elements of D<i,<s,t» . The entire conditional 
is true iff (i) the semantic object P E D<i, <S,t» that is provided by the 
context and is contrasted with q is such that p(gc(3» (wc) = 1 and for all 
maximal sets X in Awc({ w I there is an interval i such that q(i)(w) = 1 n, 
p(gc(3» i!: X, and (ii) the proposition {w I there is an interval i such that 
r(i)(w) = I }  follows from every maximal set in Awc( { w  I there is an interval 
i such that q(z)(w) = 1 n. 
Notation: gc = the value assignment provided in the context c (e.g. ,  gc(3) = 
the time interval that the index 3 denotes) 
D a (where a is any type) = the set of all possible denotations of type a 
Put informally, ( 18) says that a past countetfactual is true iff (i) the proposition that 
is contrasted with the one conveyed by the antecedent is true at the contextually 
salient past time (indicated by the petfect) in the actual world, and (ii) the 
consequent is true in all those worlds that are consistent with what is the case in the 
actual one except that the antecedent is true and the proposition contrasted with it is 
false in those worlds. In ( 1 4a), the proposition that is contrasted with what the 
antecedent conveys is "John gave flowers to Mary yesterday." If a temporal adverb 
is in the antecedent, it either indicates the time of the relevant eventuality 
independently of the contextually salient past time denoted by the past perfect (e.g., 
tomorrow) or introduces a time in relation to this past time (e.g . ,  the following 
day). If no adverb is present, we assume that there is a covert adverb then that 
indicates that the time of the antecedent eventuality is simultaneous with the 
contextually salient past time. ( 18) is descriptively adequate as far as the above data 
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are concerned but is not very explanatory. In particular, it does not explain how we 
obtain the proposition that is contrasted with the one conveyed by the antecedent. 
Let us see how this proposal deals with example ( 14a). ( 19) shows how its 
truth conditions are determined by (1 8). 
( 19) [If John PAST PERF3 give flowers to Mary TOMORROWF, she would PERF3 
be pleasedD = 1 iff (i) John gives flowers to Mary at g e(3) (within 
yesterday) in We, and for all maximal sets X in Awc( { w  I John gives flowers 
to Mary tomorrow in w}) ,  { w  I John gives flowers to Mary at ge(3) (within 
yesterday) in w } E X, and (ii) the proposition { w  I Mary is pleased 
(tomorrow) in w }  follows from every maximal set in Awc( { w  I John gives 
flowers to Mary tomorrow in w}) .  
According to ( 19),  the truth condition of (1 4a) is that John gave flowers to Mary 
yesterday in the actual world, and Mary would be pleased in those possible worlds 
in which John gives flowers to her tomorrow and not yesterday. This corresponds 
to the intuitive meaning of (14a). 
Given the preliminary analysis of counterfactuals in ( 1 8) ,  I am now in a 
position to present the core ideas in our proposal, which is intended to account for 
the semantics of counterfactuals containing focused constituents. According to my 
proposal, the particular proposition that is contrasted with the one conveyed by the 
antecedent is obtained via focus. To be more specific, I contend that the default 
semantic effect of focused constituents in the antecedent of a counterfactual 
conditional is obtained through the adverb instead. It is possible to use a phrase of 
the form instead of DP overtly to introduce the contrasted counterpart as in (20a­
b) . 
(20) a .  If John had given flowers to Mary TOMORROWF instead of yesterday, 
she would have been pleased. 
b .  If JOHNF had given flowers to Mary instead o f  Bill, she would have 
been pleased. 
The idea I pursue in this paper is that the semantics of instead interacts with focus 
even when it is not there overtly. I assume with Rooth ( 1992) that focusing causes 
a focus operator and a variable to be introduced as a sister node to an expression 
that contains a focused constituent in the syntactic representation. Then we can 
impose a constraint upon the relation between the ordinary denotation of the 
focused phrase and its associated variable C. 
(21)  Where tfJ is a syntactic phrase and C i s  a syntactically covert semantic 
variable, tfJ ,.. C introduces the presupposition that C is a subset of [ tfJ])f (the 
focus semantic value of tfJ) containing [tfJDo (the ordinary semantic value of 
tfJ) and at least one other element. (Rooth 1996: 279) 
In the case of ( 1  a), we can assume that its antecedent is syntactically represented as 
in (22) . Let us assume that the tense is ignored for the purpose of calculating the 
ordinary and focus semantic values of the antecedent of a conditional. The tense 
(i.e. , the perfect) constrains C, as we shall see below. 
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(22) S 
/�� 
S instead (C) 
/�� 
S ,... C 
---- -------- --
John give flowers to Mary TOMORROWF 
In order to leave open the possibility that the temporal location of the eventuality 
described in the sentence be specified further, I assume that each sentence denotes 
an element of D<i. <so t» , i.e. , a function from intervals to functions from worlds to 
truth values. Accordingly, C is an element of D« i.<s.t» .t> . I refer to semantic 
objects of this type as "temporally indeterminate propositions" in order not to 
confuse them with "regular" propositions, which are sets of worlds (i.e . ,  elements 
of D<s.t» for our purposes. l 1  The focus semantic value of John give flowers to 
Mary TOMORROWF is the set of temporally indeterminate propositions of the form 
"John give flowers to Mary X," where X is a temporal adverb like tomorrow. C 
must denote a subset of this set and must contain the temporally indeterminate 
proposition "John give flowers to Mary tomorrow" and at least one other 
temporally indeterminate proposition. In the scenario introduced above, C should 
contain exactly two temporally indeterminate propositions:  "John give flowers to 
Mary yesterday" and "John give flowers to Mary tomorrow." The meaning of 
instead is specified as in (23).  
(23) instead translates as A!« i. <s . t» .t> P,.P<i .<s . t» [A[ 3 tl [ V [P(tl )] ]  A 
'V q<i.<s.t» [[f(q) A q :F: p] � -,3t2[ V[q(t2)]]]]] 
Notation: f« i. <so t» . t> = a variable of type « i, <S, t» , t> (set of 
temporally indeterminate propositions) 
P <i .<s .t» = a variable of type < i, <s , t» (temporally indeterminate 
proposition), similarly for q<i.<s.t» 
i = the type of time intervals; s = the type of worlds; t = the type of truth 
values 
Af/J (where f/J is of type t) is an expression of type <s,t> , i.e., proposition 
vp (where p is of type <S,t> is an expression of type t, i.e. , sentence 
(22) then means that John gives flowers to Mary tomorrow and all other temporally 
indeterminate propositions in C are such that no time makes them true (i.e. , John 
did not give flowers to Mary yesterday). Let us see how this analysis of focus in 
counterfactuals combines with our preliminary analysis of counterfactuals given in 
( 1 8) .  
The perfect in the antecedent indicates the existence of  some relevant 
eventuality at a contextually salient past time. In the examples we discussed above, 
the relevant eventuality is one that obtains in the actual world and is contrasted with 
the one described by the antecedent. Thus, ( 1 8) is descriptive adequate. However, 
some counterfactual conditionals have a true antecedent clause. (24) is one such 
example due to Anderson (195 1 :37) . 
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(24) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those 
symptoms which he does in fact show. 
Although the word arsenic receives a focal stress, it does not seem to produce a 
clear semantic effect normally associated with focus. In other words, it does not 
seem to say that Jones took arsenic instead of something else. If the default 
interpretation of a focused expression in the antecedent of a conditional were always 
made available via the adverb instead, we would not expect this consequence. 1 2 
Another point to be noted here is that when we say that the antecedent of (24) is 
true, this can only mean that it is true at the contextually salient past time indicated 
by the perfect. For example, it is hard to interpret (25) in such a way that Jones 
actually took arsenic at the time indicated by the temporal adverb the/ollowing day. 
(25) If Jones had taken arsenic THE FOLLOWING DAYF, he would have 
shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show. 
This shows that when the antecedent describes an eventuality that obtains at a time 
different from the past time indicated by the perfect, then the conditional is truly 
counterfactual in that the antecedent must describe a contrary-to-fact situation. In 
this case, we must posit a (temporally indeterminate) proposition that is not 
described by the antecedent and is true at the contextually specified past time in the 
real world. On the other hand, when the antecedent is true at the past time in the 
actual world, there is no need to find such a proposition. Our task is to obtain these 
generalizations in a principled manner. 
To account for the data we have discussed so far, I revise ( 1 8) and present it 
here as in (26). 
(26) The truth conditions for a sentence of the form "If DPl PAST PERF3 VPh 
DP2 would PERF3 VP2" are given in the following way. Let q stand for 
KDPl VPl Do (tenseless), and r stand for KDP2 VP2Do (tenseless), where q 
and r are elements of D<i,<s,t» . The entire conditional is true iff (i) there is a 
p e e (where p E D<i, <s,t» ) such that p(gc(3))(wc) = 1 and for all maximal 
sets X in Awc({ w I there is an interval i such that q(i)(w) = 1 n, p(gc(3)) e 
X, and (ii) the proposition { w  I there is an interval i such that r(i) (w) = I }  
follows from every maximal set in Awc( { w  I there is an interval i such that 
q(i) (w) = 1 n. 
The main revision here is that the temporally indeterminate proposition p could be 
the one expressed by the antecedent or any other element in c. 13 If it happens to be 
the one expressed by the antecedent, then the antecedent is true in the actual world, 
and there is an eventuality described by it in the past. If p is not the one expressed 
by the antecedent, then some other element of C is true at the contextually salient 
past time. We can easily verify that when there is a tense-adverb mismatch as in 
( 14a-b), it is guaranteed that it has to be an instance of a truly counterfactual 
conditional in that the proposition expressed by the antecedent is false in the actual 
world. 
This account still does not explain why in (24), no eventuality seems to be 
contrasted with Jones' s  taking arsenic. I can think of two possible replies. One is 
that (24) may be used to contrast Jones ' taking arsenic with his taking nothing (or 
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no arsenic). If so, this alternative possibility does not seem to be salient enough to 
strike us as a real alternative. Another possibility is that compared to the case of 
"genuine counterfactuals," examples like (24) impose only trivial requirements 
upon the elements of C other than the one the antecedent denotes. To be more 
specific, all alternatives to "Jones took arsenic" are merely required to be false in the 
actual world. However, this is assumed to be the case anyway because of pragmatic 
considerations, thereby making these alternatives inconspicuous. By contrast, when 
the antecedent is false in the actual world as in (14a), at least one of the alternatives 
is required to satisfy two conditions: (i) being false in those worlds that are relevant 
to the examination of the consequent, and (ii) being true in the actual world at the 
relevant past time. Thus, those alternatives are salient This account is not definitive 
but hopefully serves as a first approximation. 
This proposal accounts for non-temporal counterfactuals, too. For example, 
in (27a) C is a subset of the focus semantic value of JOHNF give flowers to Mary. 
Similarly, in (27b), C is a subset of the set of temporally indeterminate propositions 
of the form "John give X to Mary." Also it may be instructive to note here that the 
set of temporally indefinite propositions C does not have to be a set with exactly 
two elements. For example, we could assume with regard to (27a) that Bill and 
Fred gave flowers to Mary without success. In this case, C contains three 
temporally indeterminate propositions: "John give flowers to Mary", "Bill give 
flowers to Mary", "Fred give flowers to Mary." A possible scenario in (27b) is that 
John gave books and CDs to Mary without success. A similar story can be 
constructed with regard to temporal examples as well. 
(27) a.  If JOHNF had given flowers to Mary, she would have been pleased. 
b .  If John had given FLOWERSF to Mary, she would have been pleased. 
Note also that the semantic proposal about instead in (23) can be used in simple 
(non-conditional) sentences as well. 
(28) John dated MARYF instead. 
(28) means that John dated Mary and all relevant propositions of the form "John 
dated x" are false except where x = Mary. Thus (23) makes the right prediction here 
as well. 
4. A Different Type of Association with Focus: too and as well 
In discussing the projection problem of presuppositions in conditionals ,  Heim 
(1 992) notes that there are two different types of focus effects when the antecedent 
of a conditional has a focused constituent One is the type we have so far 
considered. However, there is another type where the proposition given in the 
antecedent does not kick out the presupposed presupposition; rather the new 
proposition is simply added to what is already assumed. Consider the examples in 
(29) . 
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(29) a .  If John had invited MARYF, too, the party would have been fun. 
b .  If JOHNF had joined the club as well, everybody would have been 
pleased. 
These examples can be dealt with as instances of association with focus. The only 
difference with the earlier examples is that in (29a-b) too or as well is associated 
with focus. I posit the semantics of too or as well as in (30) . 
(30) too or as well translates as Af« i,<s,t» ,t> [Ap<i, <s,t» [1\[ 3tl [ V[P(tl )] ]  A 
3q<i,<s,t» [ftq) A q ::F: P A 3t2[ V[q(t2)]]]]]] 
Note: See (23) for the notational conventions adopted here. 
It is easy to verify that (30) gives us the right results for examples like (29a-b). For 
instance, the proposal says that if we suppose counterfactually that John had invited 
Mary in addition to someone John actually invited, then the party would have been 
fun. Similarly for (29b). 
What this shows is that the semantic effect associated with the default 
adverb instead can be overridden when expressions such as too or as well are 
present. 
5. Some Examples from Japanese 
The phenomena we have discussed in this paper are found cross-linguistically. As 
an example, let us take up Japanese. Japanese conditionals exhibit many different 
combinations of tense and aspect forms, and it is not easy to find a pattern in their 
behavior. However, the semantic distinction characterized in English in terms of 
counterfactual vs. indicative conditionals alluded to above is also found in Japanese 
and is overtly marked morphologically. Consider (3 1a-b). 
(3 1)  a .  Mosi ASITAF John kara hana-o morat-ta ra, 
if tomorrow John from flower-ACC receive-PAST 
Mary-wa yorokon-da daroo( -ni) . 
Mary-TOP be-pleased-PAST probably regrettably 
'If Mary had received flowers from John tomorrow, she would have 
been pleased. ' 
b .  Mosi ASITAF John kara hana-o more-ta ra, 
if tomorrow John from flowers-ACC receive-PAST 
Mary-wa yorokobu daroo. 
'If Mary receives/received flowers from John tomorrow, she would be 
pleased. ' 
Note: The combination of mosi and -ra roughly corresponds to the 
meaning of if or supposing in English. 
Note that in both (3 1 a) and (3 1b) the antecedent clause is in the past tense. As the 
English glosses show, (3 1a) receives a counterfactual interpretation, whereas (3 1b) 
receives an indicative-like interpretation. What sets them apart is the tense form in 
the consequent. (3 1a) has a past tense morpheme (plus the optional morpheme -ni 
'regrettably ') ,  which indicates that the entire conditional receives a counterfactual 
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interpretation. (3 1b),  on the other hand, contains a present tense form, which is 
often invoked to indicate a situation temporally located in the future. For the 
purpose of this paper, I will not attempt to propose a compositional relationship 
between various tense forms and their semantic interpretation possibilities in 
Japanese conditionals . One situation in which (3 1 a) can be used felicitously 
corresponds exactly to the situation in which (14a) can be used in English. Two 
times are compared and contrasted in this case. Another acceptable scenario is one 
in which the speaker somehow "knows" (or ftrmly believes) that Mary will not 
receive flowers from John tomorrow. For example, it can be used when John 
intended to give flowers to Mary tomorrow to celebrate her birthday but was killed 
in a traffic accident last week. In this case, there is no sense in which John' s  giving 
flowers to Mary tomorrow is compared to any other event or situation that actually 
took place in the past. The point is rather that "John gives flowers to Mary 
tomorrow" is already established at the utterance time of (3 1 a) as a false 
proposition. The English counterpart ( 14a) does not seem to be acceptable in this 
type of situation. In contrast, (3 1b) is used when Mary's  receiving flowers from 
John is not predetermined but is also not precluded. Thus, it is like future less vivid 
or future neutrally vivid conditionals in English. 
Although there are some differences between English and Japanese 
regarding the behavior of counterfactual conditionals, both languages can express 
counterfactuals about the future. Thus, the phenomena discussed in this paper are 
not esoteric facts that only concern English. 
6. A Possible Difference between Counterfactual and Indicative 
C on ditionals 
Our proposal also points to one possible difference between counterfactual 
conditionals and indicative conditionals. Counterfactual conditionals with a focused 
constituent can be used to identify a presupposed proposition that is removed for 
the purpose of processing the consequent In contrast, indicative conditionals with a 
focused constituent can only introduce a presupposition obtained by existentially 
quantifying over the variable posited in the position of the focused expression, 
which is compatible with what the antecedent states. Consider examples like (32a­
b) . 
(32) a .  If  JOHNF had given flowers to Mary, she would have been pleased. 
b .  If JOHNF gave flowers to Mary, she must have been pleased. 
In (32a), the above proposal predicts correctly that there is some proposition of the 
form 'X give flowers to Mary (at a past salient interval) ' that must be false in the 
worlds that are used to examine the consequent. In other words, instead is 
associated with focus. By contrast, the strongest assumption that we can make with 
respect to (32b) is that it presupposes the existentially quantifted proposition 3x[x 
gave flowers to Mary] . This may be an important difference between counterfactual 
conditionals and indicative conditionals. 
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7. Conclusion 
In sum, this paper proposes the following: (i) The perfect in the antecedent of a past 
counterfactual requires that one of the alternative semantic values of the antecedent 
(temporally indeterminate propositions) is true in the actual world at the past time 
specified by the context; (ii) When such expressions as too or as well are missing, 
the semantics of focused constituent in the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional 
(including the case of focused temporal adverbs) is accounted for as an instance of 
association of focus involving the adverb instead. My account is made within the 
alternative semantics theory for focus proposed by Rooth ( 1 985 .  1 992) and 
Kratzer' s  ( 198 1 ,  1 989) account of counterfactuals. 
Endnotes 
* I thank Kai von Fintel, Irene Heim, James Higginbotham, Sabine Iatridou, 
Angelika Kratzer, Yuki Matsuda, Shigeru Miyagawa, Uli Sauerland, Roger 
Schwarzschild, and other participants of SALT 10 for comments and discussions.  
All errors are mine. 
t It has been claimed that the falsity of the antecedent is not a presupposition but is 
an implicature. This is because the antecedent of a conditional is not always false in 
the actual world. 
2 I believe that it is more accurate to say that the perfect establishes a past interval 
within which a relevant eventuality obtains. However, for the sake of simplicity, I 
will assume for the purpose of this paper that the contextually salient interval is the 
time at which a relevant eventuality obtains. See Ogihara ( 1 996) for relevant 
discussion. 
3 The examples are not Lewis ' s  but preserve the tense configurations of his 
original. 
4 There may be a different way of interpreting the semantic contribution of the 
perfect (Roger Schwarzschild, personal communication) . According to Iatridou 
(2000), the perfect is used to indicate anteriority. But given the fact that the perfect 
is capable of indicating anteriority in relation to a time other than the utterance time, 
one might assume that the perfect does not mean "prior to the utterance time" but 
means "prior to some (possibly future) reference time." On this conjecture, ( 1 a) 
means approximately the following: If we assume counterfactually that at some time 
tomorrow John has already given flowers to Mary, she has been pleased at the 
time. Even if this were a possible interpretation, it would not capture the point of 
the counterfactual (la). Although (la) posits a counterfactual situation located in the 
future (Le. ,  tomorrow), the conditional also makes reference to the past, though in 
a covert way. 
5 The term "eventuality" coined by Bach ( 1 986) is intended to cover both events 
and states. 
6 This is a rough generalization and is not accurate because there are some 
counterfactual conditionals that have a focused expression in the antecedent and yet 
are true (in the actual world). This point will be discussed in Section 3 .  
7 Given that Ds is  the set of possible worlds, De the set of individuals, and Dt the 
set of truth values, j is an element of D <s, « s, t> ,t» (Le. , the set of all possible 
denotations of type <s,« s,t>,t» ) .  
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8 A set X is a maximal set in Y iff there is no Z E Y such that X is a proper subset 
of Z (i.e. , iff Y has no superset of X). See Kratzer ( 1 98 1 )  for a more complex 
version where she does not assume the existence of maximal sets in Aw (P) . 
9 See Heim ( 1994). 
10 We will discuss a counterexample to this generalization below. 
1 1  Kaplan ( 1 977 :503) refers to propositions construed as sets of worlds as 
"temporally specific" propositions. 
12 This point is due to Kai von Fintel (personal communication). 
13 This requirement may not be strong enough, but I leave this possible problem for 
future inquiry. 
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